Moreover, these things are entities that subsist in their own right. When they are ascribed to Allah, the ascription is understood to denote ownership, not an attribute. An expression, by contrast, does not subsist in its own right, just as a meaning does not. This is the fundamental distinction between ascribing attributes to Allah and ascribing created things to Him.

Those who negate and deny the attributes among the Sabians, philosophers, Muʿtazilah, and other Jahmiyyah, together with their followers—such as Ibn ʿAqīl and Ibn al-Jawzī in some of their writings, although elsewhere they state the opposite—say: “The texts merely ascribe these things to Allah. These are called texts concerning ascriptions, not texts concerning attributes.” They speak of “texts concerning ascriptions” and “hadiths concerning ascriptions,” rather than “verses concerning the attributes” and “hadiths concerning the attributes.”

An ascription may relate a created thing to Allah because it has a particular connection to Him in some respect, as with the House, the she-camel, and the spirit in His words:

“And purify My House,”

and His words:

“Allah’s she-camel,”

and His words:

“Then We sent to her Our Spirit, and he appeared to her as a well-proportioned man.”

The proponents of divine indwelling among the Christians, the extremist Shīʿah, and the Sufis, together with their followers who hold that the spirit—that is, the souls of human beings—has no beginning, and who claim affiliation with Muslim imams such as al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad, and others—including a group from Jīlān and elsewhere—say: “Rather, ascribing the spirit to Allah is like ascribing speech and power to Him. Speech and power are His attributes, and so too is the spirit.”

They also say that His words:

“When I have fashioned him and breathed into him of My spirit”

provide evidence that the human soul is a beginningless attribute of Allah.

The Christians said: