has been preceded by something else, whereas nothing precedes that which is eternal. Moreover, a particular sound does not endure for two successive moments, so how could it be eternal? He therefore held that what is eternal is the meaning. He then held this meaning to be one, admitting neither multiplicity nor division, on the grounds that it could not be restricted to a particular number of meanings, nor could infinitely many meanings exist at a single instant. He held that the Arabic Quran is not Allah’s speech.

When his view became widespread and the majority of Muslims recognized its invalidity in terms of both revelation and reason, another group—who agreed with him both on the position of the early generations, that the Quran is Allah’s speech, uncreated, and on the principle he had introduced, namely that the Quran is eternal—said that the Quran is eternal, yet consists of successive letters and composed sounds.

Their position thus combined the views of the Mu'tazilah and the Kullābiyyah. When they debated the Mu'tazilah in defence of the position that the Quran is Allah’s speech, uncreated, they used Ibn Kullāb’s method. When the Kullābiyyah disputed with them over the position that the Arabic Quran is Allah’s speech and that the Quran recited by Muslims is Allah’s speech, they argued against them using the arguments of the Mu'tazilah.

None of these views was held by anyone among the early generations, as has been explained at length elsewhere. Neither the four imams nor their companions who lived in their time held any of these views. Among those affiliated with them, only some later scholars held these views, having received them from the speculative theologians who advocated them. They were familiar neither with the views of the early generations, which are supported by the Book, the Sunnah, and sound reason