and piety, and therefore does not understand the path of Allah’s friends; he thus has no right to distinguish between Allah’s friends and others.

Third:

This speaker has stated that he agrees with al-Hallāj’s doctrine, so he belongs to the same category. His testimony that al-Hallāj is a friend of Allah is therefore testimony in his own favor, like the testimony of the Jews, Christians, and Rāfida that they themselves follow the truth. A person’s testimony in his own favor is rejected even when it is not known whether he is lying or telling the truth. How much less can such testimony be accepted in favor of himself and his group, when the Quran, the Sunnah, and scholarly consensus establish that they are misguided?

Fourth:

It should be said: Whether al-Hallāj repented privately before Allah at the time of his death or did not repent is an unseen matter known to Allah. As for the claim that he uttered these things only while overwhelmed by spiritual ecstasy, that is not the case. Rather, he wrote books and made these statements while fully conscious and alert. It has already been explained that loss of reason is an excuse that suspends accountability. Likewise, a doubt that prevents the proof from being established may constitute an excuse in outward judgment.

Even if this were assumed to be the case, it would not be permissible to say that he was executed unjustly, nor should anyone profess agreement with his beliefs or testify to what they do not know. How much more so when the facts are otherwise! The most a believing Muslim can do, if he seeks to excuse al-Hallāj, is to claim that he was overwhelmed by spiritual ecstasy and affected by doubt. As for agreeing with him on the beliefs for which he was executed, this is the condition of those guilty of covert unbelief and heresy. Likewise, whoever does not regard the execution of someone like him as lawful has departed from the religion of Islam.