The point here is that all rational people agree that a truthful statement involves knowledge and belief, while a command involves a demand. But does a statement signify a category of meaning distinct from knowledge, and a command a category of meaning distinct from will, as maintained by a group of speculative theologians such as Ibn Kullāb and those who agree with him? Or do they signify meanings belonging to knowledge and will, as maintained by the majority of the speculative theologians of Ahl al-Sunnah who affirm the divine attributes and predestination—saying, “The Quran is Allah’s speech, uncreated,” and, “Allah is the Creator of people’s actions”—and also by the Muʿtazilah and others who oppose Ahl al-Sunnah on these two fundamentals? These latter disagree with Ibn Kullāb and those who agree with him on those two fundamentals.

Hence it is said that none of the other groups agreed with him on the views he introduced concerning speech and the divine attributes, even though his position was better than that of the Muʿtazilah and the pure Jahmiyyah. As for the majority of Muslims—the jurists, hadith scholars, Sufis, and various groups of speculative theologians—they hold neither the position of the Muʿtazilah nor that of the Kullābiyyah. This has been stated by jurists of the various schools, including the followers of Abū Hanīfah, Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad, and others, in their works on the principles of jurisprudence, let alone their other books.

The point here is that people agree that every kind of statement and command conveys meanings, whether these are called demand, will, knowledge, judgment, or inward speech. These meanings differ in excellence in themselves. For our knowledge of Allah and His names is not