likewise conditional. But this is untenable, because seeing it with the certainty of sight and being questioned about worldly blessings are not conditional upon knowing of it in this world with the knowledge of certainty.

Moreover, interpreting an unqualified reference to seeing as seeing with the heart is not customary Arabic usage. Furthermore, the condition would then be identical to its consequent: the meaning would be, “If you knew with the knowledge of certainty, you would see with your hearts.” Yet that is itself knowledge, so the meaning would be, “If you knew, you would know,” which conveys nothing. Even if beholding with the heart were intended to mean something beyond mere knowledge, it is already known that someone who knows a thing can bring himself to behold it with his heart. Moreover, even if this meaning conveyed something, it would not warrant an oath, for it is of little consequence.

Furthermore, in His words:

“If you knew with the knowledge of certainty,”

He does not specify the object of knowledge such that knowing it would necessarily entail knowing of Hellfire. If a particular object of knowledge is intended, nothing in the conditional clause indicates it so as to establish the connection. If the broader object of knowledge is intended—namely, what comes after death—then that entails knowledge of Hellfire and other things. This, however, is open to question.

For someone may ask: In His words:

“You will soon know,”

and:

“Then, no indeed! You will soon know,”

He does not specify