yet He Himself is not so—glorified be He.

The reply is: This is invalid on two grounds.

First, not everyone who causes another to possess a quality, whatever that quality may be, possesses it himself. Rather, whoever causes another to possess an attribute of perfection must all the more possess that attribute himself. As for attributes of deficiency, causing another to be deficient does not entail being deficient oneself. Someone with power can render another powerless without himself being powerless. Someone living can kill another and cause his death without himself being dead. Someone knowledgeable can render another ignorant without himself being ignorant. Someone who hears, sees, and speaks can render another blind, deaf, and mute without himself being so. Thus, causing another to be unjust and untruthful does not entail being untruthful and unjust oneself, for these are attributes of deficiency.

If it is objected that an untruthful and unjust person may sometimes compel another to be truthful and just, the reply is: He has not made him truthful and knowledgeable; he has merely commanded him to be so, and the other person has done so himself.

We did not say that everyone who commands another to do something himself possesses the quality he commands the other to have.

Second, injustice is a relative and relational matter. Thus, if someone commands another to kill a person