and so the existence of one who is independent of anything else follows in either case.”

Similarly, if it is said:

“A living being either has life in its own right or derives its life from another. If its life comes from another, that other must all the more possess life and is therefore living in its own right. Thus, the existence of one who has life in its own right is established in either case.”

Similarly, if it is said:

“One who possesses knowledge either possesses it in his own right or has been taught by another. Whoever teaches another must all the more possess knowledge; and if he has not learned from another, he possesses knowledge in his own right. Thus, the existence of one who possesses knowledge in his own right is established under either of these two exhaustive alternatives, for no third possibility exists. Since one or the other must be the case, and under either alternative there exists one who possesses knowledge in his own right, one who has life in his own right, one who is independent in his own right, and one who is eternal and necessarily existent in his own right, it follows that such a being exists in reality and that his nonexistence is impossible in reality. This is what was to be proved.”

Similarly, if it is said:

“One who possesses power either possesses it in his own right or has been granted it by another. Whoever grants another power must all the more possess power. If his power does not come from another, it is inseparable from his very being. Thus, under every alternative, the existence of one who possesses power in his own right is established—one whose power is inseparable from his very being, whose knowledge is inseparable from his very being, and whose life is inseparable from his very being.”