Similarly, if it is said, “Either contingent or necessary,” and “contingent” is explained as meaning that which has come into being, this is an argument of the same kind. But if “contingent” is interpreted in a way that includes the eternal, as Ibn Sīnā and his followers, such as al-Rāzī, did, then this is invalid. For on this interpretation, one cannot establish at the outset the existence of a contingent being dependent on a necessary being, yet the proof cannot be completed without first establishing this. This can only be established on the basis that whatever comes into being must have an originator: its particular instances are witnessed, and its universal principles are known through reason.

As for affirming an eternal, beginningless being that is contingent, rational people unanimously agree that this is impossible. Ibn Sīnā and his followers also agreed that it is impossible, as they stated in their works on logic, following their predecessors. Yet they contradicted themselves at the outset. For both they and their predecessors say:

“What is possible, in the general and specific senses—that which can either exist or not exist—can only be originated; it cannot be necessary. Everything eternal and beginningless is necessary, in their view.”

Similarly, if it is said:

“Whatever exists is either created or uncreated, and whatever is created must depend on something existent that is uncreated; thus, the existence of something uncreated is established in either case.”

Similarly, if it is said:

“Whatever exists is either independent of anything else or dependent on something else, and that which depends on and needs something else can have its need and dependence met only by one who is independent of anything else