This issue is referred to as “the question of causation”: does it have real existence or not? Is causation distinct from both the cause and the effect, or not? Al-Rāzī’s statements on this differ, as has been discussed at length elsewhere.

The principal argument of those who say that the act of creation is identical with the created thing, and that causation is simply the existence of the effect—affirming nothing beyond this—is as follows: if creation and causation were something distinct from the created thing itself and the effect, they would either subsist in a substrate or not. The latter is invalid, since qualities cannot subsist independently.

This is a reply to a group among the Muʿtazilah who said that it subsists independently.

They continue: if it subsists in a substrate, it must subsist either in the Creator or in something else. The latter is invalid, because if it subsisted in something else, that other thing would be the creator, rather than Him.

This is a reply to a second group, who say that it subsists in the created thing. If it subsists in the Creator, it must be either beginningless or originated. If it were beginningless, this would entail that the created thing is beginningless, since the act of creation and the created thing necessarily accompany one another. An act of creation without a created thing is impossible, as is causation without an effect. If it is originated, this is invalid for two reasons. First, it would entail that originated events subsist in Him. Second, that originated act of creation would require another act of creation, entailing an infinite regress. Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād accepted the infinite regress and posited an act of creation for the act of creation, and another act of creation for that act of creation