make himself capable of speech. One who lacks knowledge cannot make himself knowledgeable, and one who is not alive cannot make himself alive. These attributes are thus inseparable from His essence.

Likewise, one who is not a creator cannot make himself a creator. For if He were unable to create, making Himself a creator would be an even greater act, and would therefore be impossible all the more certainly: making Himself a creator entails the existence of something created. For this reason, since He is able to make a human being an agent, He is the Creator of what that human being does. Thus, if He were to make Himself a creator, He would be the Creator of whatever He made Himself create. If, then, it is supposed that His being a creator in beginningless eternity is impossible, it would be impossible for Him to make Himself a creator in any way whatsoever. The assertion that action was impossible for Him in beginningless eternity entails its being impossible for Him always.

Yet the verse establishes that He created. It is therefore known that He has always been able to create, that creation has always been possible for Him, and that creation has always been possible and within His power. This invalidates the foundational premise of the Jahmiyyah. Moreover, if He has the power to do so, that which necessitates it is not something separate and external to Him; rather, it is from Himself. It is therefore impossible for Him to make Himself willing after not having been so. It follows that He has always possessed will and power. When power and will are present, the object of that power must necessarily exist.