and also held that its particular determinations are intrinsic to it. They did not posit anything newly arising when the new wills come into existence that would enable those wills to determine the occurrence of events.

The third view is that of the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah, who deny that will subsists in Him. They either deny will altogether, interpret it as nothing other than command and action, or affirm that a will comes into existence without inhering in any subject, as the Basrans hold. All these views, too, are known to be invalid.

The fourth view is that He has always willed through successive acts of will. Will as a kind is therefore eternal, whereas He wills each particular thing only at its appointed time. He, glorified is He, decrees things and records them, then subsequently creates them. When He decrees them, He knows what He will do and wills to do it at a future time, but He does not will to do it at that moment. When its time comes, He wills to do it. The former is resolve, and the latter is intention.

There are two views on whether He may be described as having resolve. The first disallows this, as held by al-Qādī Abū Bakr and al-Qādī Abū Yaʿlā. The second permits it, and this is the more correct view. A number of the early generations recited, with a dammah (u-vowel):

“When I have resolved, then put your trust in Allah.”

And in the hadith