and its relation to all things willed is the same, yet one of the distinctive properties of the will is that it determines particulars without a determining factor. This is the view of Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī, and their followers.

Many rational thinkers say that the falsity of this is self-evident. Indeed, Abū al-Barakāt went so far as to say, “No rational thinker has held this view.” He was unaware that it was the view of a large group of speculative thinkers and theologians.

Its invalidity is evident on several grounds: in treating the will for this as different from the will for that; in making the will determine particulars by its very nature; and in positing nothing new arising when temporal events occur that could account for a particular determination or its absence. Rather, only a relation devoid of actual existence is renewed. This is not anything real, so nothing new has arisen. Temporal events thus occur and take their particular forms without any newly arising cause or determining factor.

The second view is that of those who, like the preceding group, affirm a single eternal will, but say that as new acts occur, particular wills arise within His essence through that eternal will. This is the position of the Karrāmiyyah and others. They are closer to the truth insofar as they affirm wills pertaining to particular acts. Nevertheless, they face the same difficulties as the preceding group: they affirm temporal events without a newly arising cause, and particular determinations without a determining factor; and they make that will a single will relating to all newly arising wills