about the proofs of prophethood, resurrection, and Lordship, advancing arguments they claimed were proofs but which, upon examination, are no proofs at all. Hence, they attack one another’s proofs. Whenever they do offer a sound proof, it agrees with what the Messenger brought, even if the wording differs. Thus, one of them may offer a proof, whether sound or unsound, only for another to attack it and claim to offer something better, while actually offering something inferior. This frequently happens with their definitions: some attack the definitions of others, then offer definitions that are equivalent or inferior. Yet all these definitions belong to the same category and are valid if their purpose is to distinguish the thing defined from other things.

As for those who claim that definitions convey a conception of the essence of the thing defined, as the logicians maintain, they are mistaken and misguided, as has been explained at length elsewhere. A definition merely identifies the thing defined and points to it, much as a name does, but it sets out in detail what the name conveys in general terms. It is therefore a kind of indication, as has been explained at length elsewhere. The purpose here is simply to draw attention to the distinction between a path that yields knowledge and certainty, such as the one explained in the Quran, and the paths of the proponents of innovation that do not, and that are invalid according to both revelation and reason.