The Qadariyya sought to declare Allah free of foolishness, and their intention in this was good. For He, glorified be He, is exalted far above what the wrongdoers—Iblīs and his hosts—say. He is a just Judge. Yet their understanding proved inadequate, and a measure of ignorance led them to believe that declaring Him free of such defects required denying His power over His servants’ actions, His creation of those actions, and the all-encompassing scope of His will. Thus, while they disputed with Iblīs and his party on one point, Iblīs gained mastery over them from another direction.

This is among the gravest perils of disputing about religion without knowledge or without adhering to the truth. This is the speculative theology condemned by the early generations: its practitioner counters falsehood with falsehood and innovation with innovation.

Then various groups who affirmed Allah’s all-encompassing power debated with them, seeking to establish that Allah is the Creator of all things; that whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass; and that He has power over all things. Their capacity and knowledge likewise proved inadequate. They believed that this could not be established unless they denied Allah’s love and good pleasure, the good and bad qualities by which He has distinguished certain actions from others, and His wisdom and mercy. Accordingly, they deemed every act possible for Him, without holding Him to be above injustice or any other act.

Some went still further, entirely nullifying commands and prohibitions, promises of reward and threats of punishment. These inclined towards irjā (the Murji’ite doctrine), just as the former inclined towards the Wa‘īdiyya’s emphasis on threatened punishment.

The Wa‘īdiyya said: