what is affirmed is permissibility, as we explained concerning the verse on charitable alms, unlike the verse on expiation, which concerns obligation.

The second approach

One may say that there is no distinction between the two contexts—permissibility and obligation. Even where an obligation is concerned, combining the alternatives may be permissible, as when a person of means performs all the forms of expiation.

However, one may say that, in all these cases, “or” signifies an unqualified division into alternatives, the opposite of what “and” signifies. If no evidence indicates a prescribed sequence or a specifically designated alternative, one may perform any of the prescribed acts. This is because nothing indicates such specification or sequence, not because there is evidence ruling them out. The same applies to His words:

“Then the freeing of a slave.”

Freeing a particular slave suffices: that slave possesses the common attribute, and nothing requires a particular individual—not because any evidence points to that very individual.

If, however, evidence indicates a specifically designated alternative or a prescribed sequence, we accept it, just as we accept qualifying an unrestricted expression. Qualifying an unrestricted expression does not set aside the apparent meaning of the wording; rather, it adds another ruling to it. This is a sound approach in this matter and similar cases, for we must distinguish between what the wording affirms and what it negates.

Thus, if we hold that the penalties for those who wage war are specifically assigned on the basis of transmitted evidence or analogical reasoning, this is like holding that ablution must follow a prescribed sequence, that the slave to be freed must be a believer, and similar rulings.