only what is common does not indicate the distinguishing feature. Likewise, “or” signifies an unqualified division into alternatives: simply that one of the two things obtains. This encompasses its obtaining through a choice between it and the other, through a prescribed sequence, or through an allocation whereby one applies in one circumstance and the other in another.

Similarly, they say that, in directives, “or” sometimes conveys permission, as in “Study grammar or jurisprudence,” and sometimes a choice, as in “Have fish or milk.” By “permission,” they mean that combining the two is permissible. In itself, the particle affirms only what these cases have in common: one of the two alternatives. Whether the other is also permitted or is forbidden is not indicated by the particle itself, but by the particular subject matter. For this reason, we combine killing and crucifixion, and, according to one reported view, combine it with amputation; “or” does not preclude this.

If, then, the particle “or” merely indicates that one of the things mentioned obtains, there are two approaches here.

The first is to say that, when used in a context of obligation, it conveys a choice, whereas in a context of permissibility, it conveys what the alternatives have in common. This is the well-known account given by grammarians discussing the meanings of particles: sometimes it means permission to do one of two things while forbidding the other, and sometimes permission to do either, even if the other is combined with it, as illustrated by their examples.

Accordingly, this verse concerns permissibility, since what is negated is permissibility. It follows, then, that