Second: The purpose is to deny the permissibility of anything other than [that] (1) and to affirm its opposite: that the things mentioned are permissible in general. This encompasses both a choice between them and the prescription of a particular one. This differs from a statement intended solely to affirm something, for affirming it in wording that expresses a choice does indicate a choice.

This distinction is familiar in statements of simple affirmation and statements of restriction. Thus, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said to the claimant in a dispute:

“Your two witnesses, or his oath.”

In another wording:

“You are entitled to nothing from him beyond that.”

He thereby restricted the means of establishing the claim; the purpose was not to offer a choice.

Similarly, it is said: “What is required in a case of killing is retribution or blood money”; “Prayer is valid only with ablution or dry ablution”; “On Friday, either the noon prayer or the Friday prayer must be performed”; and “None may be allowed to remain in the abode of Islam except a Muslim or someone protected by a treaty.”

The reason is that, when part of the intended meaning conveyed by the wording is precisely what lies outside the matters mentioned, its meaning is an affirmation that entails a negation: namely, the common fact that one of these matters obtains. What they have in common encompasses both the prescription of a particular one and a choice between them. If, however, they are affirmed from the outset, then, were a particular one prescribed rather than a choice offered, without the wording indicating this, the statement would be misleading.

The third consideration is a subtle one. It may be said that “or” signifies an unqualified division into alternatives, just as we have said that “and” signifies an unqualified conjunction of the coordinated term with the term preceding it. As for sequence, it neither denies nor affirms it, for an expression that denotes