Likewise, “usury” was prohibited because of the injustice it involves, and it was required that a commodity be exchanged only for an equal amount. Yet exchanging it for goods of its own kind on the basis of an estimate was permitted when there was a need. Unlike the acts prohibited unconditionally, other prohibited things are forbidden in some circumstances but not others. This is why—and Allah knows best—He denied that anything besides those acts was prohibited, meaning an absolute, universal prohibition. What is negated is of the same kind as what is affirmed: having affirmed their absolute, universal prohibition, He denied such a prohibition of anything else.

The second point is to distinguish between what one does in relation to a person, commands, or permits, and what one refrains from forbidding another person to do or declaring unlawful for him. If forbidding a prohibited act would lead to something even more strictly prohibited, one should neither forbid it nor permit it.

For this reason, it is impermissible to oppose a wrong by means of something even more wrongful. This is also why armed rebellion against those in authority is prohibited, even for the purpose of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong: the prohibited acts committed and obligations neglected as a result are graver than the wrongs and sins committed by those rulers.

Likewise, if people engage in religious innovation or wickedness, and forbidding them would cause an evil greater than their present conduct, while they cannot be prevented from committing that greater evil and no overriding benefit would result from forbidding them, they should not be forbidden from it.

This differs from Allah’s command to the prophets and their followers to call people to Him, for their call brings about benefits that outweigh its harms, as in the call of Moses