The Jahmīs who affirmed divine decree and upheld compulsion replied:

“Rather, all actions are possible for Him, just as that particular action is possible. It is only through reports—the prophets’ reports about Him—that we know He will not do what He does not do, or will do what He does. Otherwise, whatever action is supposed, He may either do it or refrain from doing it. In reality, there is no cause, wise purpose, or attribute that entails selecting some actions rather than others. There is only a will whose relation to all events is the same. One of two identical possibilities prevails without anything to favor it.”

They were then told:

“In that case, supporting a liar with a miracle would be possible. A miracle would therefore no longer be evidence of the prophets’ truthfulness, and no prophet’s report would remain by which the distinction could be known. Thus, besides disbelief in the prophets, your position entails that the distinction cannot be known through either revelation or reason.”

They therefore sought a way to distinguish miracles from other events, arguing that allowing the possibility of a liar producing miracles would entail declaring the Creator Most High incapable of providing a means of distinguishing the truthful from the liar; or that miracles are self-evidently known to indicate truthfulness.

This matter has been discussed at length elsewhere. The error of both groups has been explained, as has the fact that those who followed Jahm in upholding compulsion—and denied Allah’s wisdom and mercy, the causes through which He acts, and the powers and other things He has created—are innovators who oppose the Book, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the early generations, while also contradicting the plain dictates of reason.

Likewise, the Qadarīs who deny divine decree oppose the Book, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the early generations, while also contradicting the plain dictates of reason.