Ahmad, Abū Hanīfa, and others. This is because wine is something the soul craves, and drinking it incurs a prescribed punishment, unlike banj, which incurs no prescribed punishment but rather a discretionary one, because it is not craved. It is like carrion, blood, and pork: consuming these incurs a discretionary punishment. Scholars generally hold that no prescribed punishment applies to them, apart from an opinion reported from al-Hasan. This concerns someone who has lost his reason.

As for someone who understands what he is saying, if he acts voluntarily and intends what he says, his words have legal effect. If, however, he is wrongfully coerced, then, according to the majority of scholars, all his utterances are without legal effect, including statements of unbelief, professions of faith, pronouncements of divorce, and the like. This is the position of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad, and others.

Abū Hanīfa and a group of scholars distinguish between what admits of annulment and what does not. They say:

Whatever admits of annulment, such as a sale, is not binding upon someone who is coerced; rather, it remains contingent upon his ratification. Whatever does not admit of annulment, such as marriage, divorce, and oaths, is binding upon someone who is coerced.

The majority dispute this distinction on two grounds: whether the stated characteristic actually applies, and whether the ruling depends upon it. They say:

Marriage and similar transactions admit of annulment. Likewise, emancipation admits of annulment according to al-Shāfiʿī and one of the two positions in Ahmad’s school. Indeed, they may rule that a slave under a contract to purchase his freedom has become free, then annul that emancipation and return him to slavery. Binding oaths, too, admit of release, as Allah Most High says:

“Allah has already ordained for you a way to release yourselves from your oaths.”