And the “crux of this discussion” is that most of those who deny some things indicated by the Quran and Sunnah while affirming others necessarily affirm something because there is a warrant for affirming it and no impediment, and deny something because an impediment exists or a warrant is absent. Or they suspend judgment when, in their view, there is neither a warrant nor an impediment. It should therefore be shown to such a person that a warrant exists for what he denies, just as it exists for what he affirms—either in every respect or in a respect that requires its affirmation. If the warrant is valid in the latter case, it is likewise valid in the former; otherwise, rejecting that warrant is no different from rejecting this one.

As for the impediment, it should be shown that the impediment he imagines in what he denies is of the same kind as the impediment he imagines in what he affirms. If that impediment—the alleged impossibility—is present on both suppositions, he does not escape the objection by affirming one and denying the other. If it is valid, it rules out both; if it is invalid, it rules out neither. He must therefore treat both alike in affirmation and denial. Since denial is untenable, affirmation is the only remaining course.

This is the crux of the argument that binds anyone who affirms anything. And everyone must either affirm something or be obliged to affirm it. This shows you, in general terms, that the consequences he claims require denial are unfounded imaginings, even without knowing in detail why they are unsound. As for the detailed argument, it establishes the invalidity of the impediment and the existence of the warrant, as has been explained on several occasions.