As for the “second,” whoever affirms some attributes while denying others should be asked: “Why, for example, have you denied the reality of His mercy and love and reduced them to His will?”

If he says, “Because mercy, as understood in our case, is a tenderness that cannot be attributed to Allah,” he should be told: “Likewise, will, as understood in our case, is an inclination that cannot be attributed to Allah.”

If he says, “His will is not of the same kind as the will of His creatures,” he should be told: “Neither is His mercy of the same kind as the mercy of His creatures, and the same applies to His love.”

If he says—and this is what his position really amounts to—“I did not establish will and the other attributes through revelation. Rather, I established knowledge, power and will through reason, as well as hearing, sight and speech according to one of the two approaches, because action indicates power, precision indicates knowledge, and particularization indicates will,” he should be told that there are three answers:

(First: The bestowal of blessings, beneficence and the removal of harm also indicate mercy, just as particularization indicates will. Bringing near, drawing close, and the kinds of particularization that proceed only from one who loves indicate love. Or, particularization in general indicates will. Particularization through the bestowal of blessings, however, is a specific kind of particularization, and particularization through bringing near and choosing is a specific kind of bringing near. The same reasoning he followed to establish will applies to matters such as these.

Second: He should be told: Grant that reason does not indicate this; it can nevertheless deny it only through the same reasoning by which it would deny will. Revelation is an independent proof in its own right; indeed,