extremism concerning outward meanings is akin to the Qarmatians’ extremism concerning hidden meanings, though the former is more barren and the latter more unbelieving.

This obstinate disputant should then be asked: “Do these names indicate the God who is worshipped and a reality that exists, or not?”

If he says no, he is an outright denier of God, and I know of no Muslim who says this.

If he says yes, he should be asked: “Why, then, do you understand that they indicate the Lord Himself, yet fail to understand that they indicate the meanings they contain, such as mercy and knowledge, when both are equally indicated?”

He must then say: “Yes, because the existence of attributes is rationally impossible, since it entails composition or a beginning in time, unlike the divine essence.”

He should then be addressed as the second group is addressed, as we shall explain: those who acknowledge that some of the meanings of these names and attributes can be understood, but not others.

He should be asked: “What is the difference between what you affirm and what you deny, or what you refrain from either affirming or denying?” The distinction must rest either on revelation—because one of the two texts conveys its meaning conclusively or apparently, unlike the other—or on reason, because one of the two meanings may or must be affirmed, whereas the other may not. Both grounds, however, are invalid in most cases.

As for the “first,” the Quran’s indication that He is Most Merciful, Compassionate, Loving, All-Hearing, All-Seeing, Most High and Magnificent is like its indication that He is All-Knowing and All-Powerful. There is no difference between them in terms of the text. Likewise, its mention of His mercy, love and highness is like its mention of His will and intent.