that are good’; and concerning negation, read:

‘There is nothing like Him.’

‘They do not encompass Him in knowledge.’

Whoever has experienced what I have experienced will know what I have come to know.”

It has thus become clear that they do not affirm the Lord’s justice, wisdom, or mercy. The same applies to truthfulness: when they sought to establish proof that Allah is truthful, they were unable to do so. They therefore said:

“Truthfulness in internal speech is necessary, because He knows all things, and it is impossible for someone who knows to have within himself an assertion contrary to his knowledge.” Al-Ghazālī and others relied on this argument.

They were answered: This is a weak argument for two reasons.

First: Truthfulness in that meaning is of no avail unless truthfulness is established in the expressions that signify it; and, in their view, it distinguishes between actions.

Second: They affirmed the existence of an internal assertion on the grounds that a person may tell you a lie, so that a meaning subsists within him that is not knowledge: namely, the meaning of the assertion. This entails that they hold that someone who knows may have within himself an assertion contrary to his knowledge.

When al-Rāzī discussed the question of Allah’s being unable to utter speech without meaning anything by it, in opposition to the Hashwiyyah, he was asked: “Has any group within the Muslim community said that Allah means nothing by His speech? The dispute is only whether He speaks words whose meaning His servants do not understand.” It was also said