conflict and contradict one another, affirming one means negating the other. This known evidence is known to affirm the one and negate the other, while the unknown evidence does the reverse. If one must be preferred, then what is known to be established must certainly be preferred over what is not known to be established.

But it may be said: “It is not established with certainty.” We have already explained that there is a difference between believing that one view carries greater weight and a belief itself carrying greater weight. Believing that one view carries greater weight is knowledge, and the jurist exercising independent judgment has acted only upon that knowledge: his belief that this view outweighs the other. By contrast, one belief outweighing another is conjecture.

Yet he is not among those of whom Allah says:

“They follow nothing but conjecture.”

Rather, there is a conjecture that this view carries greater weight and a conjecture that the other does. The former conjecture is the stronger, and its greater weight is known. His ruling is therefore based on his knowledge of the stronger conjecture and its stronger evidence. This is something he knows, not merely conjectures. The same occurs in all branches of knowledge and practical pursuits, such as medicine, commerce, and so forth.

As for their claim that jurisprudence belongs to the realm of conjecture, a number of scholars, including Abū al-Khattāb, have offered another answer: the knowledge intended here is knowledge based on outward appearances, even though one allows that the reality may be otherwise, as in His words:

“If you know them to be believers.”

The precise answer, however, is twofold: