over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is best and fairest in outcome.”

As for those of later generations who have not taken care to follow them and tread their path, nor have any familiarity with their words and deeds—among the practitioners of speculative theology, reasoned opinion, asceticism, and Sufism—they do not know the way of the Companions and their successors in much of what they discuss concerning religious knowledge or put into practice. You find that, in many important religious matters, these people rely chiefly on what they suppose to be consensus, although they know nothing whatsoever of the early generations’ views on those matters, or know some of their views but not the rest. Sometimes they report a consensus while knowing only their own position and that of their opponents among later groups—one, two, or three groups. At other times, they know the views of some of the early generations.

The former case is common in “questions concerning the foundations of religion and its subsidiary matters.” Thus, you find the books of speculative theologians filled with such claims: they report consensus and disagreement while knowing nothing whatsoever of what the early generations said on the matter. Indeed, the position of the early generations may lie entirely outside the positions they mention. You find this in questions concerning Allah’s speech, actions, and attributes, such as the questions of the Quran, seeing Allah, divine decree, and other matters.

When they speak of the consensus of the Muslims, they have no knowledge of that consensus. Even if it were possible to know the consensus of the Muslims, these people would not be among those who possess such knowledge, because they do not know the views of the early generations. How much more so, then, when, in the case of the Muslims, it is impossible to establish with certainty