are one and the same. Thus they identified each attribute with the others and identified the attributes with the One described by them. Some go further, saying that knowledge is the entirety of what is known, as al-Tūsī, author of Sharh al-Ishārāt (Commentary on the Pointers), maintains. He criticized Ibn Sīnā for affirming that He knows Himself and what proceeds from Himself. Ibn Sīnā was closer to the truth, yet he nevertheless contradicted himself by denying that attributes subsist in Him, identifying the attribute with the One described by it, and identifying every attribute with every other.

Thus these thinkers went further in monism and heresy than those who say that the meanings of speech are one and the same. Yet they argued that their position necessarily followed from the latter’s view, saying: “If multiple meanings can be one and the same, then knowledge can be identical with power, and power with will.” The most astute among the latter acknowledged that there was no answer to this argument.

They then said: “And if one attribute can be identical with another, then the attribute can be identical with the One described by it.” Then came Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Sabʿīn, al-Qūnawī, and other heretics like them, who said: “If one attribute can be identical with another, and the attribute with the One described by it, then the necessarily existent, beginningless Creator can be identical with the contingently existent, originated creature.” They therefore said that the existence of every creature is identical with the existence of the Creator, and said: “Existence is one.” They did not distinguish between being one in kind and being one