that are conclusive. Clear reason and the general agreement of rational people establish that nothing produced by an agent acting by his will is necessarily inseparable from his essence. Indeed, this holds for every agent: none of his effects is necessarily inseparable from his essence, nor is it conceivable that a particular effect should be simultaneous with him—even supposing that he acts without will. How much more, then, does this apply to an agent who acts by will!

The claim that an effect is simultaneous with its cause is valid only for causes that function as conditions. A condition need not precede what depends upon it; rather, it may accompany it, just as life accompanies knowledge. An agent, however—whether called a cause or not—must precede the particular act, and none of the effects of that particular act can be simultaneous with it. Rational people have never known an agent from whom a particular effect is necessarily inseparable. The statement, “I moved my hand, so the ring moved,” concerns a condition, not an agent.

Furthermore, if the world were eternal, its agent would necessarily produce its effect by virtue of his very essence from eternity, and what he necessitated and entailed would not come after him. Were that so, no event could ever come into being. This contradicts what is observed—even if He, glory be to Him, has always had the power to speak and act; indeed, has always spoken whenever He wills, done whatever He wills, and possessed the attributes of perfection and the qualities of majesty and honor.

The world contains order and precision that demonstrate the Lord’s knowledge; particular features that demonstrate His will; goodness that demonstrates His mercy; praiseworthy outcomes that demonstrate His wisdom; and it contains