others—say that the term “speech” applies only to a complete, meaningful sentence, such as one composed of two nouns or of a noun and a verb. Sībawayh, the sage of the Arabic language, mentions this in his chapter on quoting with “to say,” where he explains that “to say” is used to quote what constitutes speech, but not what is merely an utterance. Only complete, meaningful sentences are quoted with “to say.” Thus, it is clear that these constitute speech in the Arabic language.

When jurists apply the term “speech” to two or more letters in their discussions of prayer, they are concerned only with what invalidates prayer, whether or not it conveys a complete meaning and whether its expressions have an assigned meaning or none. Even producing a prolonged vocal sound and intoning melodies used in singing invalidates prayer, although this is not speech in the linguistic sense.

When someone swears that he will not speak, or that he will certainly speak, however, they make the fulfilment or breach of his oath depend only on what constitutes speech according to his customary usage, even if this is narrower than the speech that invalidates prayer. Thus, if someone swears without qualification that he will not speak, he breaks his oath by uttering the speech of created beings. But does he break it by speaking the words of the Quran?

Some scholars say that he does not break it under any circumstances. Others say that he does not break it by reciting it during prayer. Still others withhold judgment, because an oath is interpreted according to the oath-taker’s customary usage. Thus, the breadth or narrowness of the term “speech,” as these jurists use it, depends on the rulings attached to it.

When the early generations condemned the proponents of speculative theology and said, “The scholars of speculative theology are heretics,” and, “No one who has embraced speculative theology has ever prospered,” they did not mean speech in general,