it is indeed sound if its premises are sound, even though its conclusions generally concern mental universals that exist in minds, not in external reality, as with mathematical knowledge concerning numbers and magnitudes. For number abstracted from the things numbered, and magnitude abstracted from bodies, exist only in the mind. But how can its premises be sound when most of those used in metaphysics are mere claims whose universality is asserted, and whose propositions are taken as conceded without proof? Whenever a syllogism lacks a proposition known to be universal, it does not establish the desired conclusion. They confuse unquantified propositions, which have the force of particular propositions, with universally applicable, conceded propositions; alternatively, they assert their universality through some form of analogical reasoning.

It is well known that every syllogism must contain a “universal proposition.” Yet most of the “universal propositions” they use to establish their metaphysical conclusions are not known to be universally applicable. Their universality is supposedly established only through analogical reasoning, which may be among the most unsound forms of reasoning, entailing the likening of Allah to His creation. Thus they say, “From one, only one proceeds.” Yet they have nothing to support this except likening the Creator of the heavens and the earth, the Lord of all worlds, to natural properties, such as those of water and fire.

Moreover, the “one” they posit in metaphysics—and likewise in logic, where they treat the proposition concerning species as composed of it, namely “genus” and “differentia”—has no reality and exists only in minds, not in external particulars. We have discussed this at length elsewhere. We have explained that the intelligible entities they posit, namely the “intellectual substances” abstracted