Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal—and this became widespread among some later adherents of Ahmad ibn Hanbal—and they combined the positions of the Muʿtazilah and the Kullābiyyah. They agreed with the latter that it is eternal, and with the former that it consists of letters and sounds. They introduced an innovated doctrine—as others had done—saying:

The Quran is eternal, consisting of eternal, beginningless letters and sounds, inseparable from Allah Himself, exalted is He, throughout eternity, past and future. They supported its eternity with the arguments of the Kullābiyyah, and its consisting of letters and sounds with the arguments of the Muʿtazilah.

When they were told that some letters are preceded by others—bā precedes sīn, and sīn precedes mīm—whereas what is eternal cannot be preceded by anything else, and that sound cannot conceivably persist, let alone be eternal, they replied: Speech has both existence and essence. This resembles the position of those among the Muʿtazilah and others who distinguish between existence and essence.

They said: Speech has an order in its existence and an order in its essence. The temporal [precedence] of bā over sīn pertains to its existence, whereas in its essence bā coexists with sīn, without preceding it in time, although it precedes it in position. This is like some written letters preceding others: a scribe may write the end of the Quranic codex before its beginning, yet once he has written it, its beginning precedes its end in position.

The majority of rational thinkers replied to them: This is something whose invalidity is self-evident, for sound cannot conceivably persist, and the claim that an essence exists apart from what exists in external reality is a claim