a speaker, for no one can be conceived of as a speaker unless speech subsists in him, or as willing unless will subsists in him, or as loving, pleased, hating, or merciful unless will, love, pleasure, hatred, and mercy subsist in him. Many of the Mu‘tazilah who followed Abū Hanīfah in jurisprudence agreed with them on this. Among the other imams of the Muslims, none espouses the Mu‘tazilah’s positions on denying the attributes, divine decree, the intermediate position between the two positions, or carrying out the threat of punishment.
The Mu‘tazilah and the Kullābiyyah then disputed the true meaning of “speaker.” The Mu‘tazilah said: A speaker is one who produces speech, even if he brings it into being in another. This allowed them to say that Allah creates speech in another and is its speaker.
The Kullābiyyah said: A speaker is one in whom speech subsists, even if he does not speak by his will and power and performs no act at all. Rather, they regarded a speaker as analogous to a living being in whom life subsists, even if his life is not by his will or power and does not result from any act of his.
As for the early generations, their followers, and the majority of rational people, a speaker, as they understand the term, is one in whom speech subsists and who speaks by his will and power. A speaker in whom speech does not subsist is inconceivable, as is a speaker who speaks without his will and power. Thus, each of these two groups of innovators adopted only part of what characterizes a speaker: the Mu‘tazilah held that he produces speech, while the Kullābiyyah held that he is the subject in whom speech subsists. The Mu‘tazilah then claimed that he could produce speech in another. They also claimed, together with those followers of the Kullābiyyah who agreed with them, such as Abū al-Hasan