is like saying, “They share individuation in the absolute sense but differ in their particular necessity.” Clearly, this is unavoidable, whether or not it is called composition. No existent, whether necessary or otherwise, can be devoid of such commonality and distinction. Whatever is inseparable from existence cannot possibly be denied of necessary existence.

“Furthermore,” the shared, absolute universal is universal and shared only in the mind, not in external reality. Accordingly, neither contains anything that the other shares with it in external reality. Rather, whatever attribute one possesses, the other does not possess that very same attribute or share in it; indeed, it does not resemble or match it in that respect. Since this commonality exists only in the mind, neither would be composed of a shared element and a distinguishing element. Rather, each would possess an attribute peculiar to it, in which the other does not resemble it, and an attribute in which the other does resemble it. There is nothing objectionable in this.

Furthermore, it may be said:

This is refuted by the case of existence. Necessary existence and contingent existence both fall under the designation “existence,” while each is distinguished from the other by its particular character. It would therefore follow that necessary existence is composed of that which they share and that which distinguishes them. Whatever answer is given to this would also answer the earlier argument.

“Furthermore,” it may be said: Grant that you call this composition. Why, then, do you say that