Their argument is:

“If there were more than one necessary existent, the two would share necessity but differ in their individuation. What they share is distinct from what differentiates them; hence each would be composite in itself, although we have posited it [as necessary].”

Many have refuted this argument. Its proponent may be asked in reply: “When you say that they share necessity but differ in their individuation, do you mean that the necessity peculiar to each is shared by the other, or that they share necessity in the absolute, universal sense?” The first is false; no rational person would intend it.

As for the second, the reply is:

Their sharing an absolute universal is like their sharing individuation in the absolute, universal sense. For one has an individuation peculiar to it, while the two individuations share individuation in the absolute sense. Likewise, one has a reality peculiar to it, and the other has a reality peculiar to it, while both share reality in the absolute sense. Similarly, one has an essence peculiar to it, and the other has an essence peculiar to it, while both share essence in the absolute sense. The same applies to all other terms that are general when left unrestricted and particular when qualified, such as “existent,” “self,” “quiddity,” and others.

That being so, it is clear that they share necessity in the absolute sense, while each is distinguished by its own necessity through an individuation peculiar to it.

Accordingly, there is no difference between necessity and individuation in this respect.

Thus, the statement, “They share necessity in the absolute sense but differ in their particular individuation,”