Or, if you wish, you may say:

It is impossible for anything, by its very essence, to necessitate from all eternity something that comes into being and is not beginningless, whether it does so through an intermediary or without one. If that intermediary is beginningless, whatever necessarily follows from it must also be beginningless. If it comes into being, the same argument applies to it as to whatever comes into being through its mediation. What they have conceded here is also known by plain reason. The premise is therefore both demonstratively established and conceded.

Yet they say that it is a complete cause of what is beginningless—such as the celestial spheres, according to them—but not a complete cause of temporal events. This too is false.

For anything said to be beginningless, such as the celestial spheres, either must coexist with temporal events—as they say of a celestial sphere, that motion must necessarily accompany it and that it has always been moving—or need not coexist with any temporal event. If the former is the case, it follows that the cause must be a complete cause of temporal events. Yet its being a complete cause of temporal events is impossible.

For whatever coexists with temporal events and is never free of them, but is necessarily accompanied by them, cannot proceed from its necessitating cause without them. It is impossible for something to exist without that which necessarily accompanies it. If motion necessarily accompanies a celestial sphere, as they say, then the sphere’s existence without motion is impossible. Thus, that which necessitates by its very essence and is a complete cause of the celestial sphere must also be a complete cause necessitating whatever inseparably accompanies it, and a complete cause from all eternity of the sphere together with its motion. But a beginningless complete cause cannot be a beginningless complete cause of temporal events, whether motion or anything else, because its effect—which is what it necessitates and entails—must exist