all the pitfalls into which others had fallen. There was nothing in this position for those opponents to object to except that something connected to the Lord’s will and power should subsist in His essence.

The Mu‘tazilah denied that any attributes subsist in Him, expressing this by saying that no accidents or things that come into being subsist in Him. Thus, they called the knowledge, power, and life that subsist in Him “accidents,” and the acts of creating, bestowing goodness, coming, arriving, and descending that subsist in Him “things that come into being.” They said to the early generations of the Muslim community, its imams, and the majority of its members:

“If you say that particular speech is inseparable from Him, then you have said that accidents subsist in Him. If you say that He speaks by His choice and power, then you have said that things that come into being subsist in Him.”

These people replied:

“The Mu‘tazilah’s assertion that these things do not subsist in Him is false, contrary to the Book, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the early generations of the Muslim community. It also contradicts the plain dictates of reason, for affirming one who knows without knowledge, one who is powerful without power, and one who is living without life is impossible according to the plain dictates of reason. Likewise, affirming a creator who does not create, one who is just without justice, an agent in whom no action subsists, and a Lord who cannot Himself act, but is instead like an inanimate object, denies Him the attributes of perfection—just as affirming a Lord who neither knows nor has power denies Him the attributes of perfection.”