than that of Ibn Sīnā and his followers. Aristotle and his followers did not establish “the First Cause” through an argument from existence, nor did they divide eternal existence into necessary and contingent. Rather, according to them, whatever is contingent must have originated. Nor did they affirm for the Necessary Existent the distinctive attributes that set the Lord apart from the celestial spheres. Rather, this was a modification introduced by their later followers, who combined their philosophy with the theology of the Muʿtazila and similar groups. It was Ibn Sīnā and his followers who established the Necessary Existent through an argument from existence.

The true substance of these thinkers’ position is that originated events exist without any originator whatsoever. This is evident in the position of those who make the First a final cause of motion, since it does not follow from this that it is the agent producing that motion. Their position concerning the motions of the celestial spheres thus parallels that of the Qadariyya concerning the motion of living creatures. Both groups have contradicted themselves. For these thinkers maintain that a living creature’s action proceeds from something other than itself, since capacity and motive together necessitate the occurrence of the action, and both capacity and motive come from something other than the servant.

They may therefore be told: Say the same concerning the celestial sphere’s motion through its capacity and motive, for these two must proceed from something other than the sphere itself. That which is necessary in itself would then be the originator of those originated events, one after another, even if through the mediation of the intellect. This is the position maintained by Ibn Sīnā and his followers. It too is false, because the eternal cause that necessitates by its very essence, whose effect and necessary consequence coexist with it, cannot give rise to