that the celestial spheres were eternal. Philosophers in both groups disagree over whether attributes and originated events subsist in the Necessary Existent, holding two well-known positions. Many leading ancient philosophers affirmed this, as did some later philosophers, such as Abū al-Barakāt, the author of al-Muʿtabar, and others. I have set out their views at length elsewhere.

Another view holds:

Rather, if that which necessarily entails originated events is contingent in itself—and it is this that is termed a product, an effect, something subject to a Lord, or similar expressions—it must have come into being. If, however, its existence is necessary in itself, it cannot have come into being. This is the position of the leading authorities of the religious communities and the foremost philosophers, and it is the position of the great majority of the people of hadith.

The proponent of this view says: Whatever is never free of originated events and is contingent in itself must have come into being. Or: Whatever is never free of originated events and is an effect, a product, something created or fashioned, must have come into being. For if it is a product that necessarily entails originated events, it cannot be eternal. An eternal effect could be eternal only if it had a cause that was itself eternal and necessarily entailed its effect, such that the effect existed with it from eternity, without coming after it. This, however, is impossible. Being a product is incompatible with being eternal. Indeed, being eternal is incompatible with being contingent: according to the great majority of rational thinkers, both earlier and later, only what has been brought into being can be contingent. This is the position of all the ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle and his followers. Only some later philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā and his followers, affirmed an eternal contingent being; they differed in