distinguish between what had been accepted and what had not. Many jurists who rely on independent reasoning also reject numerous reports by stipulating conditions and raising counterarguments with which they dismiss and set them aside. Some, for example, reject a report because, they claim, it contradicts the apparent meaning of the Quran, established principles, or analogies drawn from those principles; because the practice of the later scholars of Medina runs contrary to it; or for other reasons discussed in the well-known debates found in works of jurisprudence, hadith, and legal theory.

The fourth source:

Consensus. Its authority is generally acknowledged among Muslims—jurists, Sufis, hadith scholars, speculative theologians, and others. Some adherents of innovation among the Mu‘tazilah and the Shia, however, have rejected it. Yet the consensus that can be known with certainty is that of the Companions; ascertaining consensus after their time has generally proved impossible. Hence scholars have differed over claims of consensus arising after the Companions. They have also differed over particular questions concerning it, such as the Successors’ agreement on one of two positions held by the Companions, a consensus from which some participants dissented before their generation had passed away, tacit consensus, and other matters.

The fifth source:

“Analogical reasoning based on textual evidence and consensus.”

This, too, constitutes authoritative evidence according to the great majority of jurists. Many jurists who rely on independent reasoning, however, have used it excessively: they have employed it before searching for textual evidence, rejected texts on its basis, and even employed invalid forms of it. Among speculative theologians, hadith scholars, and practitioners of analogical reasoning are those who reject it altogether. This is a major question, and the correct position lies between excessive and insufficient use.