Thus, anyone who still claims that it applies generally to everything called a sale is mistaken.

Ibn al-Murahhal said:

“I concede that it applies generally only to every sale that is not called usury.”

Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn replied:

“That was precisely the point. But this invalidates the claim that its general applicability is unrestricted, for claiming unrestricted general applicability is incompatible with claiming that it applies generally to some categories but not others. This is perfectly clear.”

Someone claimed that there were two views on the matter: first, that it is a general statement whose scope has been restricted; and second, that its full generality is intended.

Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn said:

“The claim that its full generality is intended is certainly false, for we know that many individual forms of sale are forbidden.”

Ibn al-Murahhal objected that those forms had been forbidden after having been permitted, making this a case of abrogation.

Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn said:

“That would entail that we could not prohibit any sale on the basis of a solitary report or analogical reasoning, for the Quran cannot be abrogated by either of these. Its general scope, however, may be restricted by them. The jurists have agreed on prohibiting sales on these grounds.”