and thus it is clear that conceiving the object of gratitude is part of conceiving gratitude.

I say:

Even if it were said that this is merely something privative, if a thing’s true nature comprises both existence and nonexistence, both must be mentioned when defining it. Likewise, when defining a father precisely as a father, conceiving him depends on conceiving fatherhood, which is a relation, even though the father is something positively existent.

Praise and gratitude relate to that for which praise and gratitude are offered. Even if this relatedness does not attach to a positive attribute, praise and gratitude cannot be understood without understanding their object, just as the meaning of a father cannot be understood without understanding fatherhood, which is the relation involved.

Likewise, praise and gratitude are two things related to that for which praise and gratitude are offered, and this relation forms part of what these terms denote. The proof is that someone who does not understand admirable attributes cannot understand praise, and someone who does not understand beneficence cannot understand gratitude. If understanding them depends on understanding their respective objects, then it depends all the more on understanding the relation itself. For the relation is derivative of its object and dependent upon it. If understanding praise and gratitude depends on understanding their objects, which are further removed from them than the relation itself, then it depends all the more on understanding that relation—even if the relation is something privative. And Allah knows best.