their definitions the relations in question, for these form part of their essential nature. Such concepts cannot be conceived without conceiving the things to which they relate. These objects of relation therefore form part of their essential nature and must be mentioned in their definitions. Praise and gratitude relate to that for which praise and gratitude are offered. Their essential nature cannot be fully stated without mentioning their respective objects, which therefore form part of that nature.

Al-Sadr Ibn al-Murahhal objected:

A thing has no positively existing attribute by virtue of the object to which it relates. Thus, neither praise nor gratitude has any positively existing attribute by virtue of its object. For the attribute connected with that object is relational, and relations have no positive existence. If an attribute has no positive existence, it cannot form part of a thing’s essential nature, because nonexistence cannot be part of existence.

Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn replied:

Your statement that a thing has no positively existing attribute by virtue of the object to which it relates is not universally true. It may have such an attribute, or it may not.

What most speculative theologians actually say is:

The object of speech has no positively existing attribute by virtue of that speech.

Attributes involving a relation are of two kinds:

The first is a pure relation, such as fatherhood, sonship, being above, being below, and the like. It is this kind of attribute of which it is said:

It is merely a relation, and relations have no positive existence.

The second is a positively existing attribute that is related