and acting upon them, as mentioned at the beginning of the question when presenting the argument advanced by some people. This is a sound argument: if someone were held accountable for inward thought once it became firm resolve, despite neither speaking of it nor acting upon it, that would contradict the text. However, the reply is as follows:

This applies to a person subject to the divine commands who has the ability to speak and act, yet does neither. As for a firm intention accompanied by doing all that is within one’s power, it is treated like an intention accompanied by full performance of the act. This is illustrated by someone unable to speak, who may also be unable to act with his hands or other limbs. If he nevertheless gestures to the utmost of his ability, his gestures are treated like another person’s speech with respect to legal rulings, reward, punishment, and other matters.

As for the other argument he advanced—namely, that resolve and an inclination to act fall without qualification within the inward thoughts that are pardoned—this is not so. Rather, it is correct to say that a firm intention necessarily entails the occurrence of some action to which blame, punishment, and other consequences attach. For if the intended act is within one’s power, then, given a firm intention, it must occur. If it is impossible, a firm intention must nevertheless be accompanied by some of the actions leading up to it. Where no action whatsoever occurs, there is only an inclination. Inward thought is not a firm intention.

For this reason, the scriptural texts do not grant pardon for everything described as intention, love, hatred, envy, arrogance, self-admiration, or other acts of the heart. Whenever these acts bring blame and punishment upon people, it is because they have reached completion, becoming speech and action.