And the “correct analysis” is that when the prohibited act does not occur, a person is spared its harmful consequences—censure, punishment, and the like. When he actively refrains, guards against it, and avoids it, he has performed a righteous deed, an act of obedience and piety, and so receives the benefits of that deed—praise, reward, and so forth. Thus, the absence of harm results from the absence of evil deeds, while the attainment of benefit results from the performance of good deeds.

In sum, “renunciation” consists in not wishing for or desiring what one renounces, whereas “scrupulousness” consists in feeling aversion and dislike toward what one scrupulously avoids. The absence of desire is appropriate only toward something that offers no unmixed or predominant benefit. By contrast, aversion is appropriate only toward something that entails unmixed or predominant harm.

If we suppose that something has neither benefit nor harm, or that its benefit and harm are equal in every respect, then it is appropriate neither to desire it nor to dislike it. Renunciation is therefore appropriate toward it, but scrupulousness is not. It thus becomes clear that everything toward which scrupulousness is appropriate is also something toward which renunciation is appropriate, but not vice versa. This is plain: whatever it is appropriate to dislike and feel averse to, it is also appropriate not to desire or wish for. For where aversion is appropriate, the absence of desire is all the more so; and the presence of aversion entails the absence of desire, but not vice versa.

Not everything that it is appropriate not to desire is something that it is appropriate to dislike. Indeed, matters may arise that it is appropriate neither to desire nor to dislike, neither to love nor to hate, and neither to command nor to forbid.