rather than another, so that, for them, doing or not doing either permissible act is equivalent. As for those who are foremost and brought near to Allah, they engage in permissible acts only when these become acts of obedience through their good intentions and their use of them as aids to obeying Allah. Their permissible acts thus become acts of obedience. Accordingly, their actions are either those that are better performed, which the revealed Law therefore recommends, or those that are better left undone, which it is preferable for them to refrain from, even though doing them entails no sin. The revealed Law has explained the rulings governing all actions. This, then, is one “objection.”

A “second objection” is that, supposing some actions are neither commanded nor forbidden—as is the case for the righteous—such an action is neither praised nor blamed, neither loved nor hated. All that is considered is whether the divine decree brings it about or not. Indeed, they receive no praise for doing it, nor do they receive praise for refraining from it. Thus, it cannot be counted to their credit that, in this action, they are like a corpse before the one washing it, when the action proceeds from their own choice and will. For that is precisely what is under discussion.

As for actions other than “voluntary actions”—namely, what is done to a person, such as being carried when he cannot resist—these fall outside the scope of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, the servant is commanded to love what is done if it is good, to hate it if it is evil, and to feel neither love nor hatred for it if it is neither good nor evil. Thus, whoever regards a person, in the voluntary actions for which the divine decree employs him, as being like a corpse before