And “the precise resolution of the matter” is this: our statements that a command to do something prohibits its opposite and its opposites, and that prohibiting something commands its opposite or one of its opposites, are of the same kind as our statements that commanding something also commands whatever it necessarily requires; that whatever is indispensable to fulfilling an obligation is itself obligatory; and that prohibiting something also prohibits whatever is indispensable to avoiding it.

For the existence of what is commanded entails the existence of whatever it necessarily requires and the absence of its opposites. Indeed, the existence of anything likewise entails its existence, the absence of its opposites, and the absence of a prohibition against it. Moreover, the nonexistence of anything entails the nonexistence of whatever necessarily entails it. If it can cease to exist only through an opposite that He creates—as with states of being—then its absence necessarily entails the existence of one of its opposites. This is true in itself. These necessary consequences, however, arise from the requirements of existence, even when commanding them is not intended. There is an established distinction between what is deliberately commanded and what necessarily accompanies its existence.

(The first) is what one is blamed and punished for omitting, unlike (the second). Someone commanded to perform Hajj or attend the Friday prayer who is far away must travel from that distant place, whereas someone nearby travels only from a nearby place. Traversing those distances is therefore a necessary requirement of what is commanded. Nevertheless, if these two duties—the Friday prayer and Hajj—are neglected, the punishment of the person farther away is not greater than that of the person nearby. Indeed, the reverse would be more fitting, even though the reward of the person farther away is greater. If these necessary requirements were themselves intended by the command, a person would be punished for omitting them, which would mean that the person farther away incurred a greater punishment. This is categorically false.

Likewise, when someone does what is commanded, he must refrain from its opposites, but