may—or at least some of them may—allow that the evidence is equally balanced and hold that the obligation is fulfilled by choosing either opinion. They say that, in reality, there is no evidence underpinning a probable judgment; rather, one opinion is preferred merely because of inclination and desire, just as an angry disposition favours vengeance and a forbearing disposition favours pardon.

This view is mistaken. There must, in reality, be a determinate truth that the person reasoning from evidence sometimes reaches and sometimes misses. This is like the Kaaba for someone uncertain of the direction of prayer. If his independent judgment leads him to a particular direction, he discharges his obligation by praying towards it, just as a jurist acts according to an opinion reached through independent judgment. Both are obedient to Allah. Each is correct in the sense that he is obedient to Allah and receives a reward for that; this does not mean, however, that he has correctly identified the determinate truth. That truth can only be one, and whoever reaches it receives two rewards.

This concerns discerning the categories for which evidence exists in Islamic law, although it may be hidden from the servant. For the Lawgiver has explained (the general rulings).

As for (judgments concerning particular cases), termed “tanqīh al-manāt” (refining the basis of a ruling)—such as whether a particular person is upright or an evildoer, a believer or a hypocrite, a friend of Allah or His enemy; whether a particular person is an enemy of the Muslims who deserves to be killed; whether a particular property belongs to an orphan or a poor person deserving kindness; or whether particular wealth is threatened by an oppressor’s injustice, such that, if the oppressor loses interest in it, its rightful owners will benefit from it—these