and that a mountain is larger than a part of it. The same applies to the two contradictories, namely existence and nonexistence. When a person conceives of the existence and nonexistence of anything whatsoever, he knows that it cannot be both existent and nonexistent at the same time, nor can it be neither existent nor nonexistent. He makes this judgment about specific particulars even without bringing the universal proposition to mind. The same holds for similar cases.

Since universal syllogistic inference yields a general result rather than a specifically identified one, the existence of the Maker must be established through signs, as set forth in the Quran and as Allah has innately disposed His servants to do. Although the syllogistic method is valid, its benefit is incomplete. When the Quran employs inference in verses concerning divine matters, it uses a fortiori reasoning, not inference that establishes a common attribute. Whatever imperfections and defects contain no perfection, and from which a created being must be held free, the Maker, exalted is He, must all the more be held free of them. Likewise, whatever perfection containing no deficiency is established for a created being—such as life, knowledge, and power—the Creator has an even greater right to it. Thus, all created things are signs of the Creator.

The difference between a sign and syllogistic inference is that a sign points to the very object sought, of which it is a sign and an indication. Every created thing is therefore evidence and a sign of the Creator Himself, as we have explained at length elsewhere. Moreover, innate dispositions recognize the Creator without these signs, for they have been formed to do so. If they did not recognize Him without these signs, they would not know that a given sign points to Him.

For a thing to be a sign of Him and to point to Him is like a name pointing to what it names: one must already have conceived of what is named and recognized that this is its name. Likewise, for one thing to be evidence of another requires conceiving of what the evidence indicates and conceiving of that evidence as necessarily entailing it. One must therefore know that the evidence necessarily entails what it indicates. If what it indicates had not been conceived of, it would not be known that the evidence points to it,