and Ād and Thamūd, and those after them, whom none but Allah knows? Their messengers came to them with clear proofs, but they put their hands to their mouths and said, ‘We reject what you have been sent with, and we are indeed in troubling doubt about what you call us to.’”

“Their messengers said, ‘Can there be doubt about Allah, the Originator of the heavens and the earth? He calls you so that He may forgive you some of your sins and grant you respite until an appointed term.’ They said, ‘You are only human beings like us. You wish to turn us away from what our forefathers worshipped. So bring us clear proof.’”

“Their messengers said to them, ‘We are only human beings like you, but Allah bestows His favour upon whomever He wills of His servants. We cannot bring you any proof except by Allah’s permission. And in Allah let the believers put their trust.’”

Thus, Allah—glorified be He—relates how the disbelievers disputed with the messengers, first concerning lordship, for they doubted Allah, to whom the messengers were calling them; and second concerning prophethood, saying:

“You are only human beings like us.”

This is precisely the inquiry pursued by the disbelieving philosophers. If a person denies it, however, that is denial; and denial is narrower in scope than disbelief. Everyone who denies what the messengers brought is a disbeliever, but not every disbeliever denies it. Rather, he may be doubtful if he is examining it, or turn away from it after having given it no consideration. He may also be heedless of it, having formed no conception of it whatsoever. Yet his punishment depends upon the message being conveyed to him.

Both possibilities—adding denial to a general knowledge, or adding disbelief without denial—occur frequently among those who follow either of the two paths: reasoning through abstract inference, and practising worship alone. For example, many speculative thinkers have affirmed the Necessary Existent or the Maker of the world, yet have adopted various positions concerning His identity and attributes, positions whose details cannot be set out here—which are well known