The point here is that this is the underlying premise of those who say that the Quran is originated, and of those who say that no speech or will subsists in the Lord—indeed, neither knowledge, life, power, nor any attribute whatsoever.

When the unsoundness of this position became evident in light of revelation and reason, a group who shared their fundamental premise said: “He does not speak by His will and power. Rather, His speech is inseparable from His essence, just as life is inseparable from His essence.” Some of them then said that His speech is a single meaning, because an infinite number of meanings cannot coexist at a single instant, and because it cannot be restricted to one number rather than another. They said: “That meaning is the command enjoining everything commanded and the information concerning everything spoken of. If expressed in Arabic, it is the Quran; if expressed in Hebrew, it is the Torah; and if expressed in Syriac, it is the Gospel.”

They also said: “Commands and prohibitions are attributes of speech, not types of it. Thus, the meaning of the ‘Verse of the Throne,’ the ‘Verse of Debt,’ ‘Say: He is Allah, One,’ and ‘May the hands of Abu Lahab perish’ is one and the same.”

The vast majority of rational people replied: “Merely conceiving this position is enough to recognize its unsoundness.” They also asked them: “Did Moses hear all of Allah’s speech, or only some of it? If you say all of it, it follows that he knew all that Allah knows. If you say some of it, then His speech admits of division.”

They further said to them: “If you allow that the reality of a declaration is the reality of a command, and that the reality of prohibiting everything prohibited and commanding everything commanded is the reality of information concerning everything spoken of, then allow that the reality of knowledge is the reality of power, and that the reality of power is the reality of will.”

Their most accomplished thinkers acknowledged that this consequence was inescapable for them. Their position also entailed the possibility that the reality of the essence is the reality of the attributes, and that the reality of necessary existence is the reality of contingent necessity. A group of them accepted this consequence and said: